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Abstract— Register Files (RFs) are the most frequently accessed
memories in a microprocessor for fast and efficient computation and
control logic. Segment registers and control registers are especially
critical for maintaining the CPU mode of execution that determines
the access privileges. In this work, we explore the vulnerabilities in
RF and propose a class of hardware Trojans which can inject faults
during read or retention mode. The Trojan trigger is activated if
one pre-selected address of L1 data-cache is hammered for certain
number of times. The trigger evades post-silicon test since the required
number of hammering to trigger is significantly high even under process
and temperature variation. Once activated, the trigger can deliver
payloads to cause Bitcell Corruption (BC) and inject read error by
Read Port (RP) and Local Bitline (LBL). We model the Trojan in
GEM5 architectural simulator performing a privilege escalation. We
propose countermeasures such as read verification leveraging multi-
port feature, securing control and segment registers by hashing and
L1 address obfuscation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardware Trojan [1] is a malicious modification in a circuit
that causes a chip to perform undesirable operations. Ideally, these
modifications made to an Integrated Circuit (IC) should be detected
during pre-Silicon verification and post-Silicon testing. In order to
evade such structural and functional testing, an adversary designs
the Trojan to activate only under certain rare conditions and to
remain undetected during the test phase. For example, the analog
Trojan trigger proposed in [2] charges a capacitor every time an
instruction is being executed. After few cycles, the capacitor charges
up and asserts a signal which is used to flip some specific bits of
control logic and can escalate the adversary’s user privilege.
Hardware Trojan is composed of two parts: Trigger and Payload
[3], [4]. A Trojan trigger similar to [5] has been considered in this
work (details in Section II.A). Once triggered, the Trojan delivers
payloads to the Register File (RF) such as, Bitcell Corruption (BC),
Read Port (RP) and Local Bitline (LBL) Trojans. The RP and LBL
Trojans inject read errors. Note that we have considered the trigger
proposed in [5] (over [2]) since it, i) is robust against process and
temperature variation; ii) evades post silicon testing and system
level detection mechanisms; and, iii) incurs less area overhead.
We note that RF stores security critical information and a
tampering can lead to leakage of sensitive data. For example, a
code segment (CS) register file contains a Current Privilege Level
(CPL) field that determines whether the CPU is currently executing
in user mode or kernel mode. User mode processes are restricted
from accessing data from the kernel space based on the CPL set in
the CS register. The adversary can take control of the kernel mode
by manipulating the RF entry that stores the execution mode and
run unauthorized operations.
Attack Model: We have assumed that the Trojan trigger and
payload has been either inserted by the designer or by the untrusted
fabrication house. The adversary is a user who is sponsored by the
fabrication house and is aware of the trigger requirements. After
the deployment of the chip in the market, adversary can launch
a malicious program to activate the trigger. The adversary can
then deploy the desired payloads using the proposed BC/RP/LBL
Trojans. Note that even if the trigger is activated, BC/RP/LBL
Trojans can remain dormant (until payload deployment conditions
are met) and the system functions normally. The Trojan payload
changes the CPL field in the CS register from 3 (user mode) to 0
(kernel mode). This essentially escalates the privilege of adversary’s
process and allows access to kernel space.
Note that the work [2] also proposes a Trojan which escalates
user privilege. However, the differences are: i) the trigger [2] works
for a specific architecture where Supervisor Register (i.e. payload)
to breach security is implemented using D-flip flops, however,
modern processors employ RF to store control bits that is considered
in this work; ii) the trigger in [2] is activated after a repeated
sequence of unlikely events such as division-by-zero, whereas [5]
hammers a L1 cache address with unique data pattern. The trigger
in [2] can be detected by a routine that counts these events to
flag a security issue. We consider address hammering [5] which is
extremely difficult to detect since keeping track of each address is
nearly impossible.
In summary, following contributions are made in this paper.
We, (a) summarize the vulnerabilities of RF design which can be
exploited to insert Trojan; (b) propose information corruption by BC
Trojan and inject read error by RP and LBL Trojan; (c) demonstrate
a privilege escalation attack with an exploit code in GEM5; (d)
propose detection and countermeasures such as, hashing, validation
using redundant read port and obfuscation of L1 addresses.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents background
on Trojan trigger and system architecture; Section III describes
background on RF and explores its vulnerability; Section IV de-
scribes the proposed RF Trojans; Section V presents the attack
demonstration using GEM5. Section VI presents a discussion on
the practicality of the proposed Trojans and possible defenses; and
finally, Section VII draws the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Trigger Design [5]
The trigger circuit (Fig. 1) is designed to be activated if a
particular memory address (AddSET , chosen during Trojan design)
Fig. 1: Capacitor-based Trojan trigger circuit [5].
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is written with a specific data pattern, P SET for at least NSET
times. The trigger has two inputs namely, V (AddSET) and V (P SET).
V (AddSET) (= 1V) is the wordline enable signal of AddSET . For
V (P SET), a simple logic circuit can be implemented which outputs
logic 1 (1V) if a specific data pattern is sent to data bus. For
example, let’s consider that the data bus width is 8-bits. Assume
that four specific data bits are taken to design the trigger logic e.g.,
data[0], data[3], data[4] and data[6]. The logic circuit will output
‘1’ if data[0] = data[3] = data[6] = 1 and data[4] = 0. In practice,
data bits with low activation probabilities can be used to design the
logic to lower the overall probability of assertion unless intended.
Whenever AddSET is written with P SET data pattern, MOSFETs
M1 and M3 turn ON and CTrojan charges up from the V (P SET) via
Fowler Nordheim (FN) tunneling [6] through M2. Note that M2 has
a thinner gate oxide compared to other MOSFETs and its source
and drain are shorted (i.e. M2 behaves as a capacitor). M4 is an
OFF transistor which offsets the gate leakage of M5 and prevents
unwanted charging-up of node X2. M7 keeps node X3 as low as
possible until node X2 charges up sufficiently. The node X4, that is
charged up during the hammering process, is used as the SET input
of an SR latch. SR latch output (VTrigger) transitions from 0→ 1
when X4 charges up to ∼0.5V which requires NSET = 1837. The
signal VTrigger is then used to deploy the RF Trojan payloads.
The work [5] shows that adversary hammers for a duration of
TON and then stays idle for TOFF and repeats this cycle. However,
the circuit can still be triggered (minimum TON% = 30) but with
a higher NSET since CTrojan does not significantly leak during
the OFF cycle. Therefore, it becomes even harder to prevent this
Trojan activation using system level techniques such as limiting
consecutive accesses to one particular address up to a threshold.
VRESET can be generated to deactivate the trigger by writing
to AddRESET for at least NRESET times with a specific data
pattern, P RESET and using a circuit similar to the trigger one. A
smaller CTrojan (∼1fF) can be used in the RESET circuit to
minimize the area (NRESET = 92). However, the AND’ed output
of V (AddRESET ) and V (PRESET ) can also serve as VRESET .
The trigger is robust and evades testing under worst-case process
and temperature variation [5]. Trigger area/static power are both <
0.0001% of that of a typical memory. Therefore, it has been noted
that the trigger can pass optical inspection/side channel analysis.
B. System Architecture Overview
We consider a standard X86 microprocessor architecture with
with L1 and L2 caches, where the L1 cache is further separated
into L1 instruction cache and L1 data cache. The L1 cache is
virtually indexed and physically tagged to improve performance.
The system runs a standard Linux kernel with paging enabled and
a flat linear address space (transparent segmentation). The memory
management unit (MMU) in the microprocessor has a paging unit
with fully associative TLB to speed up address translation, and
memory protection is enabled in the paging unit.
Memory Layout: Applications running on a specific CPU ar-
chitecture have their complete view of the memory space (known
as the virtual address space) addressable by the CPU. The installed
physical memory (and the physical address space) is limited, and so
the virtual address space is divided into smaller chunks known as
virtual pages (Fig. 2a) that are mapped to the physical memory as
physical frames. The corresponding mapping information (virtual
page number → physical frame number) is stored in a per-process
page table in the OS kernel. The page table entries (PTE) also store
some associated metadata bits signifying protection status, caching
information, etc. as shown in Fig. 2b. When the CPU accesses a
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Fig. 2: (a) Paging in a 32-bit address space with 4KB pages, and
(b) Page Table Entry (PTE) fields for Intel X86 32-bit paging.
memory address, the corresponding page mapping is pulled from
the page table in the kernel and cached onto the TLB in the CPU.
In a 4GB virtual address space, the higher order 1GB of addresses
are used by the kernel and is known as the kernel space. The
remaining 3GB are given to the user processes and is known as
the user space. The user space is segmented into several segments
which may contain readable or writable data, or executable code.
The kernel space also has its own code and data segments. Note
that user space code has access to the data in the user space only,
and no access to the data in the kernel space. However, kernel space
code can access data from both the kernel and user space.
CPU Protection Rings: The operating system and the CPU work
in conjunction to decide what user mode applications have access
to. This protection is maintained in terms of privilege levels, that
protects three primary resources: memory, I/O, and permission to
execute certain machine instructions. In the x86 architecture, there
are four privilege levels or protection rings: 0 (highest privilege) to 3
(lowest privilege); although, modern x86 OS kernels use only rings
0 (for kernel mode) and 3 (for user mode). At any time, the CPU
is configured to run in either of these two rings, which determines
the Current Privilege Level (CPL) of the code in execution. The
CPU keeps track of the CPL by using segment descriptors stored in
segment registers. The code segment (CS) register has a 2-bit field
that specifies the CPL. When the kernel (user) code is executing,
the CS register is updated and the CPL is set to 0 (3).
Memory Protection with Paging: Memory protection in modern
systems is primarily handled at the paging unit which is responsible
for converting a linear virtual address to a physical address. Bits 2
(U/S) and 1 (R/W) in the PTE of each page signify the protection
status. The U/S bit is set (1) for kernel pages and unset (0) for user
pages. The R/W bit, although not responsible for setting privileges,
is used to mark executable code pages as non-writable, so that a
process cannot overwrite existing code. For RF-Trojan design, we
are primarily concerned with the U/S bit in the PTE. When an
address belonging to a particular page is accessed by some code,
the corresponding PTE is read from the kernel and cached onto the
TLB. The paging unit compares the CPL of the code set in the CS
register with the U/S bit set in the PTE. If the U/S bit is set to 1,
access to the data page is given to the code only if CPL is set to
0. This ensures that a segmentation fault is caused if the user code
(with CPL 3) accesses kernel data pages (with U/S bit = 1).
Fig. 3: Register file architecture with 4 read and 4 write ports [7].
(a) (b)
Fig. 4: (a) RS and (b) WS generation for reading/writing an address.
III. REGISTER FILE: BASICS AND VULNERABILITIES
In this section, we present RF basics and its architecture and point
out its vulnerabilities that can be exploited to implement Trojans.
A. Basics of Register File
RF is fastest and most frequently accessed memory in the
memory hierarchy where CPU holds temporary data and addresses.
In every clock cycle, CPU may need to read multiple registers (for
arithmetic instructions) to cater to the instructions and concurrently,
write the outputs from previous instructions to the register file.
Therefore, each register requires multiple read/write ports so that
multiple entries can be read simultaneously by different instructions.
The RF is designed in a way that only one write port can write at
a time and write data can be bypassed to read ports using bypass-
mux while writing if a processor needs to read that register in the
same clock cycle. Modern superscalar processors require more than
6 ports in the register file. RF is implemented using two back to
back inverters similar to SRAM. However, multiple read/write ports
are employed as mentioned before. The local and global bitlines
employ domino logic for faster operation [7].
B. RF Architecture
In this work, we have implemented 256 × 32-bits/word RF with
4 read and 4 write ports [7] using 22nm PTM technology [8] in
HSPICE (Fig. 3). The 8:256 address decoders per port is leveraged
to send the Read/Write Select (RS/WS) signals to the array. Each
Local Bitline (LBL) (one per read port) is connected with 16 register
cells. There are 16 such local bitlines for each Global Bitline (GBL)
making 16 × 16 = 256 RF entries. There are 32 such group to
constitute 32-bits/RF entry by selecting only one cell/GBL.
During read/write operation, the RS/WS are sent to the array in
the first cycle. In the second cycle, 256 D1 footed-domino buffers
per port are triggered by φ1 signal, buffered from the incoming
50% duty-cycle core clock Clk and drive the decoded RS (Fig.
4a) and WS (Fig. 4b) signals across the 32-bit array width. Fig. 5a
shows the different phase signal generation from Clk.
Fig. 5b shows two read ports on each side of the storage cell for
symmetric loading and optimal cell write stability [9]. Furthermore,
(a) (b)
Fig. 5: (a) Phase signal generation for read/write operation; (b) 4
read ports for each bitcell.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: (a) LBL scheme, and (b) GBL scheme for read operation.
balanced pass transistors are used on each side of the storage cell
to enable single-ended full-swing write operation. The write data
Din, is locally inverted to get its complement.
Fig. 6a and 6b shows the full-swing LBL and GBL scheme.
LBL is precharged to Vdd when φ1d (a delayed version of φ1) is
low. If one of the RS is asserted and the corresponding stored data
is ‘1’, LBL discharges when φ1d is high. Note that bitcell write
operation occurs when φ1d is high. Two LBLs are merged via a
static NAND gate leading to a dynamic 16-way NAND-NOR. Note
that LBL phase is fully time borrowable enabling the RS/WS signals
to arrive into the LBL evaluate phase. The GBL is a dynamic 8-
way OR which merges the LBL 2-input static NAND outputs to
deliver a 32-bit word per read port. GBL evaluation is done when
φ2 (inverted signal of Clk) is high to avoid precharge races and
crowbar currents at the phase boundary, the GBL domino is footed
by the clock transistor. GBL phase is also fully time borrowable
(LBL NAND outputs arrive into GLB circuit when φ2 is high).
C. RF Vulnerabilities
Two back to back transistors of RF cell that stores information is
prone to noise. It gets worse due to technology and Vdd scaling. If
the noise is more than the static noise margin, it can flip the stored
data. Therefore, adversary can leverage this to corrupt the stored
data. The domino logic implemented for RF makes it even more
prone to noise [10]. For example, LBL or GBL discharge can be
prevented or they can be discharged intentionally during evaluation.
This will lead to a read error.
IV. RF TROJANS
In this section, we present BC, RP and LBL Trojans which can
cause data corruption and read errors along with their overheads.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: BC Trojan: (a) payload circuit; (b) control logic.
(a) (b)
Fig. 8: (a) 1− > 0 and (b) 0− > 1 data resetting using BC Trojan.
Fig. 9: BC Trojan: Layout showing 4 RF bitells (with one read/
write port) and metal tracks allocated for bitlines (horizontal) and
wordlines (vertical). One M4 track can be stolen to connect RF
data node to Trojan payload transistor (located in the column area).
A. BC Trojan
RF bits can be reset to ‘0’ or ‘1’ when the cells are at retention.
Fig. 7a shows the proposed BC Trojan (in grey color) that can
corrupt the stored bit. Fig. 7b shows the logic to generate the
control signal for BC Trojan. Once the Trojan trigger is activated
(i.e., VTrigger = 1), writing Addx with PSET data pattern asserts
VBC Tr0 which can be leveraged to turn ON the NMOS and short
the data node of RF to gnd. However, if Addy is written with PSET
data pattern, VBC Tr1 will be asserted which can be leveraged to
short the data node to Vdd via a PMOS. Fig. 8a and 8b show that
the minimum (W/L) of NMOS and PMOS Trojan to reset the stored
bit to ‘0’ and ‘1’ are 4 and 24 respectively. Alternative way to reset
to data ‘1’ is shorting the data node to gnd via an NMOS which
incurs less area overhead (Trojan shown in Fig. 7a with dotted
line). For a 32-bit word RF reset operation, 32 such transistor-
pairs are required. However, if the reset pattern is preselected, only
one transistor per bit is required. Fig. 9 shows the layout of 4 RF
bitells (having one read/one write port) and metal tracks allocated
for bitlines (horizontal) and wordlines (vertical). One M4 track
per global column connects the target RF data node to the Trojan
payload transistor which is co-located with sense-amp and other
peripherals in the column area.
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: RP Trojan: (a) payload circuit; (b) control logic.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11: (a) 0− > 1 and (b) 1− > 0 read error using RP Trojan.
Fig. 12: RP Trojan: one extra M3 track is needed compared to BC.
B. RP Trojan
RP Trojan (Fig. 10a) can be implemented if adversary requires
error injection during read operation. In this case, only one NMOS
Trojan is required to inject both type of read errors. VRP Tr can
be asserted if Addx is written after Trojan trigger is activated (i.e.
VTrigger = 1) during LBL evaluation period (φ1d = 1) (Fig. 10b).
If the write data pattern is PSET , 1− > 0 read error will be injected
(since VF = 1). Otherwise, VF will be 0 and 0− > 1 read error
will be injected. Fig. 11a and 11b show that the minimum (W/L) of
NMOS Trojan to inject 0− > 1 and 1− > 0 read error are 6 and
15 respectively. If a single Trojan is implemented for both type of
errors, the minimum (W/L) should be 15. Fig. 12 shows the layout
to insert RP Trojan. In this case, we need one additional M3 track
compared to BC Trojan. Note that the same bit can be read through
different port differently with RP Trojan.
C. LBL Trojan
Faults can be injected during read operation of RF, i.e. data ‘0’
will be read as ‘1’ (or vice-versa) using the proposed LBL Trojan
(a) (b)
Fig. 13: LBL Trojan: (a) payload circuit; (b) control logic.
(a) (b)
Fig. 14: (a) 0− > 1 and (b) 1− > 0 read error using LBL Trojan.
TABLE I: Features of the Proposed 2-bit RF Trojans
Trojan Static Dynamic Area Use
Power (nW) Power (µW) (µm2) Case
BC (0→ 1) 0.079 62.44 0.056 Kernel
BC (1→ 0) 0.083 8.37 0.023 Leak
RP (0→ 1) 12.93 45.38 0.048 Kernel
RP (1→ 0) 33.73 112.34 0.064 Leak
LBL (0→ 1) 35.28 57.54 0.022 DoSLBL (1→ 0) 11.26 24.57 0.026
(Fig. 13a). NMOS and PMOS Trojans are required to inject read
1− > 0 and 0− > 1 faults respectively which can be turned ON
using VLBL Tr0 and VLBL Tr1 (Fig. 13b) respectively. Similar to
RP Trojan, VLBL Tr0 and VLBL Tr1 will only be asserted when
φ1d is high during the read operation (LBL evaluation period). Fig.
14a and 14b show that the minimum (W/L) of NMOS and PMOS
Trojan to inject 0− > 1 and 1− > 0 read errors are 3 and 7
respectively. Note that unlike RP Trojan, in LBL Trojan, all the 16
bits (each of different RF entry, Fig. 6a) connected with the Trojan-
infected LBL will incur the read error if those cells are read when
VLBL Tr1 = 1 or VLBL Tr0 = 0 (payload deployed). Furthermore,
the Trojan can be implemented in the peripheral area where the
component density is slightly relaxed.
D. Overhead Analysis
Table I summarizes the area/power overheads for 2-bit Trojans
(to corrupt the CPL field) along with the required control logic.
However, we didn’t consider the parasitics since they only affect the
delay. Note that all the Trojans can be implemented in the peripheral
area where there are enough empty space. For BC Trojan, one M4
and for RP Trojan, one M3 and one M4 track needs to be routed
to column area. We can conclude that the static power overheads
of the Trojans are insignificant. The dynamic power of some cases
is high. However, they will only occur one time when they are
activated. Trojan use cases (Table I) are explained in Section VI.
V. PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING RF-TROJAN
We describe a simple proof-of-concept attack demonstrating the
use of the BC Trojan. The goal of the attack is to gain access to
and read data from kernel data pages. The malicious RF-Trojan
is deployed in the system architecture as shown in Fig. 15. With
the knowledge of the RF-Trojan, the adversary runs his exploit
code. The adversary’s code runs in user mode and the CPL in the
CS register is set to b’11 (3) accordingly. The adversary process
initially accesses a ‘trigger’ address T (AddSET ) for at least NSET
times with PSET pattern (here, 10). The trigger is placed in a
L1 d-cache line (which maps to T ), that monitors its access for
NSET times and activates the trigger (i.e. VTrigger = 1). Next,
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Fig. 15: Trojan design in the system architecture with attack steps.
1 #include <stdio.h>
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3 
4 void main()
5 {
6 int *addr_t;
7 void *addr_k;
8 int i, data;
9 
10 /* N: Number of accesses to trigger address, 
minimum 1837 */
11 int n = 2000;
12 
13 /* T: Address of trigger; value initialized */
14 addr_t = 0x602010;
15 *addr_t = 10;
16
17 /* K: Address of kernel data */
18 addr_k = 0xFFFFFFFF80711000;
19
20 /* Trigger the Trojan by N accesses to T */
21 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
22 {
23 data = *addr_t;
24 }
25
26 /* After Trojan activation, successfully read 
from K */
27 printf("## Trojan activated ##\n");
28 printf("addr_k = %p\tvalue = %x\n", addr_k, 
*addr_k);
29 }
Fig. 16: Example exploit code using the RF-Trojan.
Fig. 17: GEM5 debug logs showing privilege escalation.
an additional access to T (AddX ) with PSET pattern generates
a signal for the Trojan payload deployment (i.e. VBC Tr0 = 1).
For simplicity, we have used the address T for both AddSET and
AddX . The Trojan payload is placed in the CS register in the CPU.
After the payload is deployed, CPL field is set to b’00 (0), which
maliciously elevates the privilege of the adversary’s code to ring
0. The adversary can now successfully access and read data from
an address K in the kernel pages (with U/S bit set to 1), since the
paging unit now thinks that the CPU is in CPL 0. The exploit code
is shown in Fig. 16. Without deploying the payload (lines 21-24),
reading from addr k in line 28 will cause a segmentation fault,
since the corresponding kernel page has the U/S bit set to 1 in the
PTE while the CPL for the code is 3.
We model the RF-Trojan in GEM5 simulator in x86 architecture.
We have considered an AtomicSimpleCPU model for the Trojan
deployment. To simulate the Trojan trigger, we added code to
the readMem() function in the CPU code to monitor accesses
to trigger address addr t (0x602010). Since the L1 cache is
virtually indexed, we can just monitor the cache line mapped to the
trigger address. For the Trojan payload insertion, we added code to
retrieve the current m5 register value which maintains the CPL. We
set the CPL field (m5Reg.cpl) to 0 and write back the value to the
m5 register. We added debug logs in the GEM5 code to verify the
privilege escalation (Fig. 17). After the privilege escalation of the
adversary’s process, reads from the kernel pages are made possible.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Other Possible Attack Models
In this work, we limit our attack demonstration using BC Trojan
for the sake of brevity. Attack model for other Trojans are given
below considering Trojan trigger is already activated:
Using RP Trojan: Adversary accesses Addx with data pattern
PSET . Therefore, VRP Tr0 remains 1 for a few clock cycles (equal
to L1 cache latency). If CPL field is read during this time, paging
unit will assume the CPU to be in kernel mode. The adversary
writes his exploit in a way that after the trigger is activated, the
process forks itself into multiple child processes, each of which
try to gain access to kernel page addresses (K). Since RP Trojan
injects error through only one read port, some of these processes
will terminate (since they were given access through a non-tampered
read port) while one of them gets access to address K (which was
given access through the Trojan injected read port). This is possible
since RF latency is significantly lower than L1 cache latency and
multiple RF reads are done while VRP Tr0 is asserted high.
Using LBL Trojan: The attack is similar to RP Trojan attack
except, adversary accesses Addy with PSET data pattern instead
of Addx which makes VLBL Tr0 = 0 for a few clock cycles (equal
to L1 cache latency). Note that this Trojan injects error to all the
other 15 RF bits along with the target bit that share the same LBL.
If those bits are also read while VLBL Tr0 = 0 which is highly
likely (e.g., the index field in the segment registers which point to
the current segment in use), the corresponding processes will crash.
Therefore, LBL Trojan is more suitable for Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks rather than kernel data leakage.
Exploiting General Purpose Registers (GPRs): GPRs can also
be targeted for deploying the Trojan payload. Assuming a victim
process that accesses the trigger address where the number of
accesses is controlled by user input, the adversary can trigger the
Trojan through the input. If the payload is deployed to a GPR (e.g.,
eax, ebx, etc.), the adversary can force an erroneous computation
by an instruction that uses that GPR. In case of a register indirect
addressing that uses the victim register, the adversary can force the
address pointer to point to a specific address (deployed as the Trojan
payload) in the victim process’s address space and leak sensitive
data from that address. Deploying payloads to the registers for
instruction pointer (eip), stack (esp) and base (ebp) pointers may
also be used to cause control-flow violations.
B. BC Trojan Vs RP Trojan
Attack using BC Trojan is permanent. Once the attack is
launched, the CPL field will remain modified until there is a
context switch, when the register is re-written and the Trojan
trigger is de-asserted. However, attack using RP can be sneaky and
transient since the attack can launch, get access to kernel data and
come back to normal operation. Also, the content of RF remains
correct. However, RP Trojan overheads is higher compared to BC.
Therefore, adversary can implement either one based on the use
case and design constraints to leak kernel data.
C. Countermeasures
Read verification leveraging multi-port feature: RF inherently
has the multiple read ports. We propose to use one port to read a
RF entry after it is read by another port. This will capture any read
failure caused by RP/LBL Trojans and raise an exception. This can
be done in two ways:
i) Implement a dedicated verification port: This will incur
area/power overhead. However, since the verification can be done
concurrently, this will not hurt the system throughput and detect
any failure caused by hardware Trojan. Furthermore, if the Trojan
payload is deployed to CPL only, it is likely that the CS register is
read through a single port, since, (i) only the kernel can read CPL
value, and (ii) CPL validation is performed in paging unit. Hence,
CPL verification only needs to be done with a single port.
ii) Opportunistically assign a port for verification: While access-
ing one RF entry, another unused read port can be dynamically
assigned for verification. This will incur some performance over-
head since the port assigned for verification will be unavailable for
other operations until it is freed. Furthermore, if all the read ports
are already busy, none can be assigned for verification and attack
can remain undetected. However, this saves design overhead.
Securing control and segment registers: A Physically Un-
clonable Function (PUF)-based secure hash can be implemented
which will store a hash of RF write data in a secure memory. An
arbiter or memory PUF can be used. Note that compared to an
actual hash function, the proposed PUF-based hash can be area
and performance efficient. The CR address acts as a challenge and
the response acts as a hash. Whenever this data is read, a hash of
read data can be compared with the previously stored hash of write
data. This detects any read (by RP/LBL Trojans) or retention (by BC
Trojan) failures indicating an attack. Note that we propose this only
for the control (e.g., CR0-CR4 in x86) and segment registers (e.g.,
CS, SS, DS, etc. in x86) and not for the GPRs for two reasons:
i) less overhead since PUF can be small to cater to the limited
number of narrow width control and segment registers (32-bit and
16-bit wide respectively) compared to large number of 64-bit wide
GPRs; ii) control/segment registers determine the CPU operation
mode and ensuring their security is far more critical than GPRs.
L1 address obfuscation: Typically, L1 cache is virtually indexed
and physically tagged. However, this is a vulnerability since adver-
sary can hammer L1 cache using virtual address. Therefore, L1
address obfuscation (using a PUF, for example) to change virtual
to physical mapping of L1 cache can add a layer of complexity on
the adversary. This is true since the predefined memory address can
no longer be hammered. Similar technique has been shown to be
effective in preventing side-channels in the cache [11].
D. Limitations and Possible Issues
Context switching: GPRs are very frequently used and hence it
might be limited as a target to launch real exploits. This is because,
the values of GPRs are backed up and flushed in case of a context-
switch. Hence, changing a GPR while the adversary’s attack code is
running, only affects the adversary’s code and not a victim process’s
code. The alternate strategy is to wait until the victim process comes
into context and then inject the fault in the GPR. However, this will
still be more effective in causing DoS attacks than data leakage.
Register allocation: Out-of-order pipelines have a register allo-
cation unit for GPRs which maps architectural registers to physical
registers based on availability. Hence, it might be difficult for the ad-
versary to control the access to the physical register. The adversary
can perform read/write on only the architectural registers specified
by the ISA, and thus cannot guarantee that the Trojan deployed
physical register will be used to make his attack successful.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we investigated the RF vulnerabilities that can
be exploited to implement Trojans. We proposed BC Trojan to
cause retention failure and RP/LBL Trojans to inject read error. We
demonstrate a privilege escalation attack using an exploit code that
uses the RF-Trojan to modify a critical segment register. Finally,
we propose techniques to detect/prevent such Trojans.
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